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I. INTRODUCTION
On a lazy Sunday afternoon many years ago, I sat at the kitchen
counter, gazing at my grandfather's tanned, wrinkled face through the
mist of tears that coated my eyes. My abuelito, I in his early seventies, was
recounting stories of his childhood - everything from tragedies to mi-
lagros.2 His voice quivered and his gray eyes brimmed with tears as he
spoke of the day he lost his mother.
At only sixteen years of age, my abuelito stumbled through his poor
hometown, cradling his dying mother in his arms, desperately searching
for a doctor or healer to cure his mother's asthma. The staunch poverty
that had pervaded his sixteen years of life would not allow for his
mother's salvation. My abuelito was left poorer than he had ever been -
without a mother. As time passed and new families blossomed, my abue-
lito escaped poverty and created a better life for himself and his children.
His generous spirit was all that remained of his early life of poverty. He
translated the foreign life of poverty into a compelling story even the
privileged could comprehend. I will forever remember that day because
my abuelito exposed the everyday afflictions that poverty subsumes.
Today, death from asthma seems absurd. Death from any medical ill-
ness is an unspeakable tragedy. As a society, we exhaust every possible
avenue to avoid confronting illness and are armed with advanced medical
technology when faced with illness. Yet, under the umbrella of poverty,
these confrontations are commonplace. Poverty requires the poor to rely
on charity as their only defense against dangerous diseases that threaten
to steal their well-being.
The ideology that the poor must rely on charity denies the existence of
inherent human rights, granted simply because of an individual's human-
ity. The United States of America, founded on principles of individuality
and freedom,3 has failed to regard health care as a fundamental human
right.4 The American aversion to governmental intrusion has created a
1. Abuelito is Spanish for grandfather.
2. Milagros is Spanish for miracles.
3. See U.S. CONST. Preamble (declaring that one of the purposes of the United States
Constitution is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty"); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDE.
PENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating that "all men are created equal" and endowed with
particular unalienable rights such as liberty). See generally Dieter Giesen, A Right to
Health Care?: A Comparative Perspective, 4 HEALTH MATRX 277, 278 (1994) (noting that
in the United States, individualism has prevailed over general obligations of universal hu-
manity and solidarity).
4. See Randall R. Bovbjerg & William G. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medically
Indigent: Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REv. 857, 874 (1986) (commenting that no
general federal obligation to provide health care exists); Satvinder Juss, Global Environ-
mental Change: Health and the Challenge for Human Rights, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
[Vol. 2:323
IMMUNITY OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
staggering 44.3 million uninsured Americans.' In Texas, a peculiarly in-
dependent state, 1.4 million children have no health insurance, the second
highest number in the nation.6 Overall, Texas leads the nation with 4.88
million uninsured citizens.7 Nevertheless, despite recent proposals to cre-
ate a unified health care system,8 the United States continues to allow the
welfare of its poor citizens to ride the wave of the free market.9
In the most recent surge of tort reform, Texas passed new legislation,
effective September 1, 1999, that affords civil immunity to volunteer
STUD. 121, 148 (1997) (recalling that in 1983, the Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in the Medical and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, appointed by the Presi-
dent of the United States, rejected the recognition of a right to health based on the lack of
reference to such a right in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution). See gener-
ally Kenneth R. Wing, The Right to Health Care in the United States, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L
161, 161 (1993) (indicating that there is nothing in the United States Constitution that
could be defined as a constitutional right to health care).
5. See Carlos Guerra, Texas Needs Health Care for uis Citizens, SAN Ar,ToNIo Ex-
PREss-NEWS, Oct. 7, 1999, at lB. The United States Census Bureau revealed that one in
every six Americans is uninsured. See id; see also Susan J. Landers, Groups Seek Common
Ground on Uninsured (visited Jan. 26, 2000) <http'J/www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubsamnesl
pick_00/gvsaOl3l.htm> (relating health care proposals to cover forty-four million unin-
sured Americans); Susan J. Landers, Physician Volunteers "Read Out" to Care for
Thousands of Uninsured (visited Jan. 25, 2000) <thttp://www.ama-assn.orgfsci-pubs/
amnews/pick_00/gvsb0131.htm> (relating the efforts of a program funded by Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation to serve some of the forty-four million uninsured Americans); Robin
Toner, Health Care Brings Out Contrast in Candidates, N.Y. Titms, Nov. 8, 1999, at A18.
6. See Cindy Tumiel, Texas Seen Near Bottom in Insuring Kids, SAN A,%-ro.Nio Ex.
PREss-NEws, Feb. 26, 1999, at 4B. In Texas, nearly one in every four children lack heath
insurance. See id.
7. See Guerra, supra note 5, at lB.
8. See Ann C. McGinley, Aspirations and Reality in the Law and Politics of Health
Care Reform" Examining a Symposium on (E)qual(ity) Care for the Poor, 60 BRoog. L
Rnv. 7, 18-27 (1994) (discussing the details of several Democratic health care proposals,
including President Bill Clinton's and then Senate majority leader George Mitchell's uni-
versal health care plans); Hallye Jordan & Robert A. Rankin, $65 Billion Health Plan
Proposed by Bradley, SAN ArrroNio ExPRnss-NEws, Sept. 29, 1999, at 6A (describing
Democratic presidential candidate Bill Bradley's universal health plan proposal); Toner,
supra note 5, at A18 (contrasting the different health care plans of the presidential
candidates).
9. See Carlo V. DiFlorio, Comment, Assessing Universal Access to Health Care: An
Analysis of Legal Principle and Economic Feasibility, 11 Dicx. J. Iwr'L. L 139, 151 (1992)
(describing how the United States' allegiance to economic independence and individualism
rejects the right to health care as a civic axiom); Juss. supra note 4, at 149 (suggesting that
the American ideology towards health care is that individuals who can afford health care
deserve health care); see also Jason B. Saunders. Note, International Health Care: Will the
United States Ever Adopt Health Care for All? - A Comparison Between Proposed United
States Approaches to Health Care and the Single-Source Financing Systems of Denmark and
the Netherlands, 18 SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 711, 731 (1995).
2000]
THE SCHOLAR
health care professionals providing free medical services.'" By limiting
the liability of volunteer health care providers to gross negligence and
intentional torts," the Texas legislature seems to anticipate an ameliora-
tion of the availability of adequate health care for the indigent.12
This comment will explore the ramifications of recent Texas legislation
affecting the indigent beneficiaries of free health care services and why
we elect this particular option of caring for the poor. This comment will
delve into the idea of health care as a fundamental human right and how
this idea relates to the American definition of poverty. The problem of
inadequate access to health care among the poor will be examined, with a
discussion of the recent creation of volunteer immunity in Texas and simi-
lar legislation in other states. This comment will also evaluate the reli-
ance of the poor on charity. Finally, alternative solutions will be
proposed to the problem of indigent access to health care.
II. HEALTH CARE AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT?
A. The International Community
The Texas legislature's offer of immunity for volunteer health care
providers is an implicit denial of a universal, fundamental right to health
care that has been widely recognized in international law.
Historically, several international declarations have acknowledged the
inherent human right to health. In 1946, the World Health Organization
(WHO), an international organization responsible for the formulation of
standards to protect and promote human health,' 3 defined the fundamen-
tal right to health in its Constitution as the "enjoyment of the highest
10. See TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.004(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (detail-
ing the conditions of volunteer immunity).
11. See id. § 84.007(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
12. This recent legislation will affect those that benefit from free medical services. I
use the terms "indigent," "poor," and "medically indigent" interchangeably to refer to this
affected group: a growing number of Americans who are uninsured, ineligible for Medi-
caid, and unable to afford self-pay for medical care, regardless of whether they are em-
ployed or not. See Giesen, supra note 3, at 283 (recognizing the emergence of a new class
of excluded individuals whose incomes are insufficient to cover the costs of private insur-
ance, but sufficient to place them beyond Medicaid eligibility guidelines); McGinley, supra
note 8, at 12 (acknowledging that many individuals ineligible for Medicaid are the em-
ployed or their dependents who work for employers that pay enough to disqualify them for
Medicaid, but do not offer private medical insurance); see also Alfssatou Sidimd, Many
Doing without Health Coverage, SAN ANToNIo ExPRrss-NEws, Jan. 23, 2000, at J1
(describing the plight of uninsured Americans who are ineligible for Medicaid and unable
to self-pay for medical care).
13. See Katarina Tomasevski, Health, in 2 UNrrED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 859, 859
(1995); see also Saunders, supra note 9, at 714-15.
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attainable standard of health."14 Two years later, in 1948, the United Na-
tions adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 5 (Universal
Declaration), regarded as one of the primary sources of international
standards of fundamental rights. 6 Article 25 of the Universal Declara-
tion contends that all individuals have the "right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, includ-
ing ... medical care and the right to security in the event of... sickness
... ,1' Despite its originally non-binding nature, the Universal Declara-
tion has achieved international customary law status and has become le-
gally binding in many countries; even United States' case law has
recognized that the Universal Declaration contains norms that are inter-
nationally binding. 8
Following the Universal Declaration, the United Nations adopted the
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (The Covenant). 9
The Covenant reiterated the Universal Declaration's commitment to fun-
damental rights, such as the right to health care, but noted those rights
with more specificity than the Universal Declaration.2 ' Article 12 of the
Covenant instructs ratifying states to undertake, at minimum, four initia-
tives to secure the right to health for their citizens: investing in public
health measures; providing preventive health care; adopting measures to
prevent the spread of epidemic and endemic diseases; and assuming re-
sponsibility for the critical health care of the poor and underserved. -'
Notwithstanding this international recognition of a fundamental fight
to health,' the formal declaration and enforcement of such a right re-
mains stifled by an extraordinary deference for the sovereignty of individ-
14. Juss, supra note 4, at 149-50. See World Health Organization, Health and Human
Rights (last modified Dec. 14, 1999) <http://www.who.inttinfhuman-rights.html>. Health
as referred to within the WHO's constitution is defined by the organization as -a state of
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity." Audrey R. Chapman. Conceptualizing the Right to Health: A Violanons Ap-
proach, 65 TENN. L. Rav. 389, 391 (1998).
15. See W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg's Charge That the Constutution Is
"Skimpy" in Comparison to Our International Neighbors: A Comparison of Fundamental
Rights in American and Foreign Law. 39 S. Tnx. L REV. 951, 976 (1998).
16. See id at 977.
17. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (IIIl) U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at art. 25(1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Giesen, supra note 3, at 278; Juss, supra
note 4, at 164.
18. See Davis, supra note 15, at 977.
19. See id.
20. See Chapman, supra note 14, at 390.
21. See id at 410-11.
22. See id. at 389; Juss, supra note 4, at 149-50.
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ual countries.' During the drafting of Article 12 of the Covenant, the
WHO refused to endorse a state obligation to assure access to medical
care.24 The WHO was reluctant to force states to adopt a particular
method of providing health care.' As a result, the WHO has never ad-
vocated a right to health care services based simply on individual
entitlement.26
Despite the success of the inclusion of a right to health care in the
Universal Declaration and the Covenant, there is still no international
agreement on the particular obligations of the states to provide health
care access to its populations, or whether states are obliged to assume the
responsibility of providing health care.27 A vast majority of ratifying na-
tions of the Covenant do not treat health care as a fundamental human
right.28 Thus, although the right to health care has been consistently ac-
knowledged by the international community, the ultimate security of such
a right depends on the actions of individual nations.
B. The United States
Despite the sophistication with which the United States has defined
individual rights, the right to health care has never been defined as "fun-
damental" and remains dependent on an individual's economic status.29
Under the United States Constitution, no right to health care has ever
been found by the United States Supreme Court, nor is there an affirma-
tive governmental obligation to provide health care.3" Among industrial-
ized nations, the United States is one of the few that does not grant its
citizens health care as a fundamental right.31 Among democracies, the
23. See Tomasevski, supra note 13, at 874 (commenting on the approach of Interna-
tional developmental agencies, such as the WHO, which fails to address governmental du-
ties or obligations).
24. See id. at 874-75.
25. See id. at 874. The WHO refused to force States to guarantee access to medical
care, with the exception of maternity and child care. See id.
26. See id. at 874-75 (describing the struggle of the human rights movement to define
access to health care as a human right to be guaranteed by the governments of states and
the WHO's refusal to promote such an obligation).
27. See id. at 875.
28. Overall, among ratifying countries, few offer a constitutional or legal recognition
of the right to health care. See Chapman, supra note 14, at 411. Of the 130 countries that
are parties to the covenant, very few systematically monitor or amass data on the treatment
of health as a human right. See id. at 395.
29. See Juss, supra note 4, at 149 (recognizing how many Americans dismiss the idea
of an unqualified right to medical care because they prefer to reserve health care for those
who can afford to pay for it).
30. See Saunders, supra note 9, at 741-42; see also Wing, supra note 4, 161-62.
31. See Saunders, supra note 9, at 711 & n.1. The constitutions of more than thirty
other nations guarantee the right to health care to their citizens. See id.
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United States stands alone in its failure to recognize universal entitlement
to medical care.32
This failure is rooted in our unique American political tradition. The
adoption of the United States Constitution was largely premised on the
idea that certain individual rights exist as "natural" or inherent rights not
given by society or government.33 This political ideology resulted in the
creation of "negative" Constitutional rights that prevent, rather than re-
quire, any action by the government. 4 The United States has typically
defined only civil and political rights as fundamental.35 Indeed, the
United States has never ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights because of the framing of such rights as fundamental.'
The American ignorance of a universal health care right occurs despite
American public sentiment that health care should be regarded as funda-
mental.3 7 In 1938, a Gallup poll revealed that eighty-one percent of
Americans believed that the government had a duty to provide health
care to those who could not afford it.3" Nearly fifty years later, in 1987, a
Harris poll concluded that approximately ninety-one percent of Ameri-
cans supported the 1938 statement.39 In 1944, in an effort to realize such
sentiment, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed the adoption of a
second Bill of Rights' that included "the right to adequate medical care
and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health . . . "'I Unfortu-
nately, President Roosevelt's noteworthy attempt failed.4 2
32. See Chapman, supra note 14, at 390.
33. See DiFlorio, supra note 9, at 151. These inherent individual rights are not derived
from the Constitution, but antecede the Constitution. See id. The government was viewed
as not being obliged to provide for the welfare of its citizens, but instead to allow them to
pursue it for themselves. See id.
34. See Giesen, supra note 3. at 279; see also Wing, supra note 4, at 162 (asserting that
the United States Constitution does not require either the federal or state government to
ensure the health of its citizens). The United States Constitution does not actually require
the government to provide any benefits relating to domestic or social welfare. See id. at
162-63.
35. See Davis, supra note 15, at 966 (noting that fundamental rights do not encompass
social and economic rights); see also Theodore R. Marmor, The National Agenda for
Health Care Reform" What Does it Mean for Poor Americans?, 60 BRooK. L. REv. 83, 97
(1994). Aside from education, an individual's status as an American has never legitimized
an entitlement to the "public provision of services". See id.
36. See DiFlorio, supra note 9, at 144-45.
37. See generally id. at 151-52 (indicating that polls demonstrate that Americans do
not think that citizens should go without health care simply because they cannot afford it).
38. See Chapman, supra note 14, at 393.
39. See id.
40. See Davis, supra note 15, at 965; see also Saunders, supra note 9, at 721 n.46.
41. Davis, supra note 15, at 991.
42. See id. at 965.
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Notwithstanding the lack of a fundamental right to health care for all
American citizens, health care providers in the United States have long
recognized a duty to care for all. The American Medical Association
(AMA) has acknowledged a physician's ethical obligation to help make
health care available to needy patients.4 3 The AMA's first code of ethics
provided for the accordance of professional services to indigent individu-
als. 44 Today, AMA's policy states that "[t]he patient has a basic right to
have available adequate health care."45 This policy was founded on the
AMA's recognition of society's responsibility to provide all people with
access to medical care, regardless of their financial circumstances. 46
In 1987, the AMA House of Delegates approved a policy urging all
doctors to "share in the care of indigent patients. '47 In 1990, the AMA
further encouraged all physicians to continue their traditional responsibil-
ity for the health care of those who cannot afford it.48 The American
Medical Student Association (AMSA) also recognized a patient's basic
right to health care regardless of the ability to pay.4 9 Thus, in addition to
American public sentiment, there appears to be an implicit understanding
of an individual's right to health care among health care providers.
C. Ramifications of the Failure to Define Health Care as a
Fundamental Right
The failure of the United States to recognize health care as a funda-
mental right has created an almost pure model of a private health care
system.50 The United States health care system consists of three tiers: the
43. See American Medical Association, The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Caring for the Poor, 269 JAMA 2533, 2533 (1993).
44. See id.
45. American Medical Association, The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethi-
cal Issues in Health Care System Reform: The Provision of Adequate Health Care, 272
JAMA 1056, 1056 (1994) [hereinafter Ethical Issues in Health Care System Reform].
46. See id.
47. George D. Lundberg & Laurence Bodine, Fifty Hours for the Poor, 262 JAMA
3045, 3045 (1989).
48. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2533 & n.5; see also Eli Ginz-
berg, Medical Care for the Poor: No Magic Bullets, 259 JAMA 3309, 3311 (1988) (encour-
aging physicians to enforce the medical ethic that all men and women have access to health
care); John Glasson & David Orentlicher, Caring for the Poor and Professional Liability: Is
There a Need for Tort Reform?, 270 JAMA 1740, 1741 (1993) (stating that caring for the
needy remains a "cardinal principle of the helping professions").
49. See Principles Regarding Health Care Delivery and Delivery Systems (visited Jan.
25, 2000) <http://www.amsa.org/about/ppp/19.html>.
50. See Dana Derham-Aoyama, Comment, U.S. Health Care Reform: Some Lessons
from Japanese Health Care Law and Practice, 9 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 365, 368-70
(1995) (detailing the three-tier system of health care coverage in the United States); see
also Saunders, supra note 9, at 732 (concluding that the primary difference between the
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first level is comprised of approximately 166 million Americans covered
by private insurance;5 the second level consists of approximately eight-
een million Americans covered by government programs, such as Medi-
caid and Medicare;5  the third level consists of approximately thirty-seven
million uninsured Americans.5 3
Individuals in the first tier, with the "luxury" of private insurance, still
do not fare well. In comparison with the twenty-three other countries
belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), "[t]he United States spends almost twice as much on each
person's health care than OECD countries, yet allots almost the same
amount of financial support to hospitals, doctors, and drugs."'
These discrepancies in efficacy between the United States and the
other OECD countries exist because health care providers in the United
States are permitted to charge more for their medical services than is
allowed in other OECD countries. 55 Additionally, due to the domination
of private health insurance companies, health care providers in the
United States are opting for a steady source of income and are not con-
sumer driven as in other countries.56 Consequently, the American health
care system has achieved a status as the most expensive system in the
world with the least efficiency and satisfaction. 7
health care systems of the United States, Denmark and the Netherlands is the fact that the
United States' system is almost entirely a private system).
51. See Derham-Aoyama, supra note 50, at 368. The majority of the 166 million
Americans in this first level obtain private insurance through their employers; the remain-
ing pay for it themselves or obtain it through other sources. See id. at 368-69. Unfortu-
nately, many individuals with lucrative health care benefits from their employers become
"insurance hostages" and are reluctant to seek other employment for fear of losing their
invaluable insurance benefits. See id. at 369.
52. See id. at 369. Medicare provides coverage for the elderly, but is not a comprehen-
sive program. See id. As a result, many elderly Medicare recipients also purchase addi-
tional private insurance to help cover costs Medicare will not cover. See id. Medicaid, on
the other hand, provides insurance coverage for low-income earners who meet certain re-
quirements and income guidelines. See id.
53. See id. at 369-70. Many individuals in this category are either employees of small
businesses that cannot afford insurance plans or are ineligible for Medicaid. See id. Addi-
tionally, the statistics for this third level are outdated. The current estimate of uninsured
third-tier Americans is approximately 44.3-45 million. See Guerra. supra note 5, at 1B;
Jordan & Rankin, supra note 8, at 6A; Toner, supra note 5. at A18.
54. Derham-Aoyama, supra note 50, at 370.
55. See id.
56. See id. See generally Marmor, supra note 35, at 100 (addressing the United States'
"flirtation with competitive models of health reform"). Such "flirtation" has created a
sorry combination of an overwhelmingly expensive health care system with largely dissatis-
fled contractors and recipients. See id.
57. See Marmor, supra note 35, at 100; see also Saunders, supra note 9. at 733-36. See
generally Kelli D. Back, Rationing Health Care: Naturally Unjust?, 12 H-.sttNE J. Pt'n. L
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The medically indigent, those without the luxury of private insurance,
are forced into the second and third tiers of this highly ineffective health
care system. At best, the indigent can hope to meet their health care
needs through Medicaid.58 Unfortunately, the American aversion to so-
cial rights has maintained Medicaid as a safety net program rather than a
sustenance program.5 9 As a result, Medicaid often suffers from cutbacks
in eligibility due to rising medical care costs;' in 1986, only forty percent
of individuals below the poverty level were covered by Medicaid.61 Ironi-
cally, funds for Medicaid are deducted from the paychecks of employed
individuals, some of whom are ineligible for Medicaid, yet unable to af-
ford medical care or insurance themselves.62
The Texas Medicaid program fails to reach a large proportion of the
poor.6 3 In Texas, Medicaid is limited to recipients of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children and covers only one-third of individuals whose in-
come is below the poverty level.' Because providers of Medicaid pa-
tients are not reimbursed at the level of reimbursement as insured
patients,65 the poor continue to be treated as second-class patients.66
& POL'Y (1991) 245, 245. "The United States spends more on health care than on educa-
tion or national defense." Id.
58. See DiFlorio, supra note 9, at 148-49. Medicaid is a state program subsidized by
the federal government. See id. Each state determines eligibility, with funds from the
federal government subsidizing funds a portion of the state's expenses depending on the
state's own resources. See id. Consequently, Medicaid coverage varies from state to state.
See id. Throughout the 1980's, Medicaid suffered severe cutbacks due to reduced federal
funding and rising medical costs, and by 1989, only forty percent of the poor in America
were covered by Medicaid. See id.
59. See Back, supra note 57, at 252 (describing how the poverty line determinations of
Medicaid coverage fluctuate with each state depending on the amount they desire to spend
on Medicaid).
60. See Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 4, at 861 (indicating that Medicaid cutbacks in
eligibility were encouraged by shortfalls in expected revenues to states and federal changes
to Medicaid in 1981); see also Derham-Aoyama, supra note 50, at 369.
61. See Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 4, at 861.
62. See Derham-Aoyama, supra note 50, at 369; see also Sidim6, supra note 12, at Jl.
63. See Eli Ginzberg, Improving Health Care for the Poor: Lessons from the 1980's,
271 JAMA 464, 465 (1994) [hereinafter Improving Healthcare for the Poor].
64. See id. at 465. The Texas Medicaid ratio ranks among the lowest in the nation.
See id.
65. See Giesen, supra note 3, at 283 (doubting the effectiveness of Medicaid if physi-
cian reimbursement levels are low and services to Medicaid recipients are reduced); Im-
proving Health Care for the Poor, supra note 63, at 465. See generally Sylvia A. Law, A
Right to Health Care That Cannot Be Taken Away: The Lessons of 7venty-Five Years of
Health Care Advocacy, 61 TENN. L. REv. 771,774 (1994) (relating how federal law grants a
great deal of discretion to states in determining how much to reimburse physicians for their
care of Medicaid beneficiaries). As a result of states' discretion, many states reimburse at
such a low level that physicians elect not to provide services to Medicaid beneficiaries. See
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Providers who do accept Medicaid patients at this low level of reimburse-
ment are often "Medicaid mills" that thrive on quantity rather than qual-
ity.67 Therefore, beyond the failure of the private insurance health care
system, public assistance programs also fail in their purpose of reaching
out to the poor.
III. REDEFINING POVERTY
A. Historical Treatment of the Poor
United States public policy and legislation addressing poverty arose
from English Poor Laws.' The colonization of America by the English
was undertaken for profit and property, and poverty and idleness were
not tolerated.69 Colonial poor laws developed from English legal tradi-
tion, which were heavily influenced by Puritan theology, and were exe-
cuted through public-private partnerships.7"
In response to the growth of cities and the resulting poverty during
colonization, colonial poor laws were enacted to define the type of relief
afforded to the indigent.71 Much like the antecedent English Poor Laws,
colonial poor laws distinguished the indigent into two groups: 1) those
who were unable to work, and 2) those who were able to work but did
not.72 Among those two groups, the poor were further distinguished into
66. See Law, supra note 67, at 775 (discussing the failed promises of Medicaid and
Medicare, when implemented in 1965, to integrate the poor and elderly into the American
mainstream of health care).
67. See Improving Healdi Care for the Poor, supra note 63. at 465 (suggesting that
because of the low reimbursement levels of state Medicaid programs, physicians must pro-
vide services to a high number of patients in order to make a profit). -Medicaid mills"
refers to groups of providers "with questionable standards" that financially thrive on treat-
ing a large volume of Medicaid beneficiaries. See id.
68. See WALTER I. TRATrNER, FROM POOR LA'W TO WELFARE STATE: A HtsroRY OF
SocIAL WELFARE IN AMERiCA 17 (5th ed. 1994); see also William P. Quigley, Work or
Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31 U.S.F. L REv. 35. 42 (1996) (com-
menting that English Poor Laws were the most important source contributing to the devel-
opment of American poverty legislation). Early public policy and statutes of Rhode
Island, Maryland, New Plymouth, and Virginia referred to an adherence to English law
regarding the treatment of the poor. See id. at 43-44.
69. See TRATrNER, supra note 68, at 23; Quigley, supra note 68, at 36 (emphasizing
that poverty and idleness were considered sinful).
70. See Michael B. Katz, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A S(XlAt. HISTORY
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 47 (10th ed. 1996): Quigley. supra note 68, at 42.
71. See TRATrNER, supra note 68, at 17; Quigley, supra note 68, at 42.
72. See TRATTNER, supra note 68, at 56; Quigley, supra note 68, at 55 (illustrating the
importance in colonial law of not rewarding voluntary idleness).
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1) those who were neighbors, and 2) those who were strangers. 73 Colo-
nial poor laws only allowed for assistance to the "worthy poor," neigh-
bors who were incapable of working.74
Implicit in poor laws was a work ethic that adhered to the belief that
poverty was a result of idleness. 75 Because many Puritans believed a di-
vine order declared that some would be rich and others poor, charity to
the needy allowed the wealthy to fulfill a religious responsibility.76 The
donation of private property to public officials for charity was a common
form of philanthropy.77
The concept of Puritan charity, however, did not reflect a giving of
alms, but rather an opportunity for the poor to work their way out of
poverty.78 During the early colonial period, assistance to the poor was
provided by placing the poor in private homes of others where their
needs for shelter and food were satisfied at public expense.79
As the colonies developed, the population of the poor expanded and
other methods of poor relief were explored.8 °
Poorhouses and workhouses were created which assisted the poor at
the price of stigmatization and shame.81 Poorhouses housed the "worthy
poor,"82 while workhouses or almshouses housed the "unworthy poor"
and forced the "idle" to work.83 Forcing the poor into these public insti-
tutions also reflected a prevalent belief in England and the colonies, that
the poor should be shamed into self-improvement. 4 To further en-
courage self-improvement, many New England cities required the poor
73. See Quigley, supra note 68, at 65. Settlement laws determined which individuals
were neighbors and which were strangers. See id. Strangers generally included the newly
arrived or immigrants. See id.
74. See id.
75. See TRATrNER, supra note 68, at 23-24; Quigley, supra note 68, at 44-45.
76. See Quigley, supra note 68, at 44.
77. See id. at 46; see also Mark Schlesinger, Paradigms Lost: The Persisting Search for
Community in U.S. Health Policy, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 937, 944 (1997) (describ-
ing the combination of public and private sources of support for community services).
78. See Quigley, supra note 68, at 45.
79. See TRATTNER, supra note 68, at 19; Quigley, supra note 68, at 60. Another form
of aid to the poor used by British colonies was farming out. See Phillip Harvey, Joblessness
and the Law Before the New Deal, 6 GEO. J. ON PoVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 21-22 (1999).
"Farming out" referred to the placement of paupers in the private home of the highest
bidder. See id. Private parties would house and feed the paupers in exchange for a fee and
labor. See id.
80. See Quigley, supra note 68, at 61.
81. See id. at 63. See generally Harvey, supra note 79, at 21.
82. Quigley, supra note 68, at 62 (stating the "worthy poor" refers to those unable to
work).
83. Id. at 62 (1996).
84. See id. at 63.
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wear badges in public.'s Badging served as another form of stigmatiza-
tion and emphasized the common moral assumption that if the poor re-
mained poor, it was simply because of their own personal decisions that
"squandered God-given opportunities. '' 86
B. Historical Views of Health Care
Health care in the United States shares a similar history. Traditionally,
health care for the poor was provided by charitable organizations, such as
churches and public hospitals, as well as through private philanthropy.'
Some cities provided for medical care to the poor through the collection
of a poor tax which helped pay for the services of medical practitioners
and midwives.' In the early 1900's, medical education was redefined and
medical schools became affiliated with universities and charity hospi-
tals.89 As a result, medical care for the poor was also provided as a com-
ponent of the medical educational process.
During the 1930's, the economic hardship created by the Great Depres-
sion precluded many Americans from obtaining health care. This lack of
access was viewed as being responsible for the poor health of a substan-
tial portion of the American population.9" Given that advances in medi-
cal technology and knowledge had improved physicians' abilities to treat
disease, the problem of distribution of health care became a responsibility
of the federal government.92
85. See id. at 63-64. The cities of New York, Pennsylvania. and New Jersey required
the poor to wear a badge with the letter "P" on it. See id. at 64. The state of Maryland
required residents of poorhouses and workhouses wear a badge with a large Roman P on
it. See id. Violations of the law warranted suspension of relief, twenty lashes, or a maxi-
mum punishment of twenty-one days of hard labor. See id.
86. See Quigley, supra note 68. at 64.
87. See American Medical Association. supra note 43, at 2533; see also James E. Da-
vis, National Initiatives for Care of the Medically Needy, 259 JAMA 3171.3171 (1988)[here-
inafter Care of the Medically Needy].
88. See Nissa M. Strottman, Note, Public Health and Private Medicine: Regulation in
Colonial and Early National America, 50 HAs T os I.I. 383, 390 & n.61 (1999) (citing the
example of Philadelphia poor laws). The incentive for cities to provide medical care to the
poor was to prevent the spread of disease. See id.
89. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2533 (1993) (stating that in
the early 1900's, care of the poor became part of the medical educational process); Care of
the Medically Needy, supra note 87, at 3171 (describing the affiliation of medical schools
with universities in the early part of the twentieth century).
90. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2533 (1993); Care of the
Medically Needy, supra note 87, at 3171.
91. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2533 (discussing the effects
of the Great Depression on health care).
92. See id.
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The federal government responded to the health care crisis by passing
the Hill-Burton Act following World War 11. 93 Under the Hill-Burton
Act, the federal government created a loan program that encouraged the
construction of hospitals in areas of underserved populations by allowing
the hospitals to repay their construction loans through the provision of
charity care.94 Although the availability of hospitals in low-income states
reached that of high-income states, the greatest gains occurred in middle-
income communities. 95
In 1965, the federal government established Medicaid as part of a
number of health care initiatives that signified a remarkable shift in re-
sponsibility for providing health care to the poor from private or charita-
ble organizations to the federal government. 96 Medicaid promised to
"integrate the poor ... into the mainstream of medical care". 97
The 1970's brought the creation of numerous other endeavors, such as
community health centers, the Veterans Administration, the National
Health Service Corps, and the Indian Health Services, aimed at providing
access to health care to distinct groups of individuals.98
By the 1980's, these several components suffered from a severe lack of
internal communication and an inability to provide the comprehensive
care promised.99 Perhaps the most damaging result of such a multi-fac-
eted system was the perception propagated that health care was solely the
responsibility of the federal government; this perception discouraged the
development of state and local initiatives to provide health care to the
poor.100
C. Contemporary Poverty & Health Care
In contemporary society, not only have the present federal and state
initiatives of providing health care to the poor failed, but the past stigma-
93. See id.; Care of the Medically Needy, supra note 87, at 3171.
94. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2533 (1993); Care of the
Medically Needy, supra note 87, at 3171; see also Joel Weissman, Uncompensated Hospital
Care: Will It Be There if We Need It? (Caring for the Uninsured and Underinsured), 276
JAMA 823, 824 (1996). Unfortunately, the number of hospitals under the Hill-Burton Act
has decreased. See id. at 824. In 1980, 4,090 hospitals participated, but by 1990, only 1,544
chose to participate in the Hill-Burton Act. See id. at 827.
95. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2533.
96. See id.; Care of the Medically Needy, supra note 87, at 3171.
97. Law, supra note 65, at 775.
98. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2533; Care of the Medically
Needy, supra note 87, at 3171.
99. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2534; Care of the Medically
Needy, supra note 87, at 3171.
100. See American Medical Association, supra note 87, at 2534; Care of the Medically
Needy, supra note 87, at 3171 (1988).
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tization of the poor lingers in the expectation that the poor be apprecia-
tive of free care provided. As a pre-med student in college, I volunteered
weekly at a community clinic that provided free prenatal care to indigent
women. The women who visited the clinic endured long hours of waiting
only to visit briefly with a physician or nurse practitioner. Nevertheless,
the rare opportunity to have some health care eased their worries for the
well being of their unborn.
One memorable evening, the clinic closed particularly late. I offered
the last patient of the evening, a woman eight months pregnant and with
four young children, a ride home. As I arrived at the humble home of the
woman and her children, she kindly touched my arm and without the
slightest hesitation, offered me her home. This kind, soft-spoken woman,
with barely enough to feed her children, offered me a place to stay should
I ever encounter a time of need.
As I drove home that evening, I was troubled by the woman's display
of gratitude. The presumption that an indigent individual should be
grateful for spending her entire evening in a homely clinic, waiting for a
brief visit with a tired, volunteer physician was absurd. I felt as if I should
have apologized to her for the shortcomings of a nation that cannot en-
sure its citizens equal opportunities to health care.
The gracious women I encountered in my experiences at the clinic were
deprived of a guarantee to health care. Remnants of the Puritan work
ethic have instilled in our culture the idea that the health of individuals,
like these women, flows only from their individual prosperity."' In order
to develop autonomous life-styles and fulfill personal goals, however, all
individuals require a bare minimum basis of physical health and well-
being.10
2
American economic productivity is severely hampered if the workplace
includes an increasing number of uninsured."0 3 The uninsured are more
likely to be absent from work due to illness, stay home to care for sick
family members, and spread what ails them to co-workers.' °4 The combi-
nation of the prevailing work ethic and the current American health care
system thus breed inefficiency; a vicious cycle of Social Darwinism, in
which the lack of health care allows illness to flourish, leads to the inabil-
ity to work and ultimately, poverty.10 5
101. See generally Saunders, supra note 9. at 731 (noting that the United States allows
the marketplace to determine the price of health care and ultimately who can afford it).
102. See Giesen, supra note 3. at 280 (claiming that if individual autonomy is valued.
health should be viewed as a "condition of human flourishing").
103. See Emily Friedman. The Torturer's Horse. 261 JAMA 1481. 1482 (1999).
104. See id.
105. See Derham-Aoyama, supra note 50. at 365 (describing the troubling condition of
the United States' health care system).
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF INDIGENT ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
A. Barriers Facing the Indigent
A multitude of existing barriers preclude the indigent from obtaining
adequate health care. The poor are more likely to be seriously ill when
admitted to the hospital, yet they receive less aggressive medical care or
specialized care upon hospitalization. 10 6 The poor are also more likely to
receive and be injured by substandard health care and to die during hos-
pitalization. °7 The health and well-being of indigent patients who rely
on government programs for medical benefits are dramatically affected
by government budget cuts.' 08 Health care facilities often avoid treat-
ment of the indigent by removing or closing paths of entry for poor peo-
ple, such as emergency rooms and obstetrical care units.1 9
The privatization of public and non-profit hospitals also excludes the
poor, as do limitations on the size of emergency rooms and restrictive
hospital admission policies." 0 Many indigent patients are hustled
through a maze of referrals only to end up in a teaching hospital that
refuses treatment for fear of malpractice claims."'
Still other hospitals refuse to treat patients unless substantial deposits
are paid or refuse to deliver babies unless the expectant mother has re-
ceived a particular amount of prenatal care. 112 Those forced to seek hos-
pital-based care must endure long waiting times and a lack of
106. See Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 4, at 864; Tom Stacy, The Courts, the Constitu-
tion, and a Just Distribution of Health Care, 3 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 77, 79 (1993); Amer-
ican Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2534.
107. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2533 (1993); see also Stacy,
supra note 106, at 79 (discussing a study revealing that uninsured patients suffer from
higher rates of in-hospital death and are at a greater risk for negligent care).
108. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2533.
109. See Marianne L. Engelman Lado, Breaking the Barriers of Access to Health Care:
A Discussion of the Role of Civil Rights Litigation and the Relationship Between Burdens of
Proof and the Experience of Denial, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 239, 248-49 (1994).
110. See id. at 249; see also Peter P. Budetti, Malpractice and Access to Care, 36 ST.
Louis U. L. J. 879, 891 (1992).
111. See Dorothy M. Allison, Physician Retaliation: Can the Physician-Patient Rela-
tionship Be Protected?, 94 DICK. L. REv. 965, 966 (1990) (stating that high-risk indigent
patients often undergo several referrals because of the liability risk they pose for
physicians).
112. See Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrini-
nation - It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 941 (1990) (describing the
ways in which minorities are excluded from obtaining health care). The ways in which
health care institutions exclude minority patients ultimately result in the exclusion of indi-
gent patients because of the intersection of socioeconomic status and ethnicity. See id. See
also Care of the Medically Needy, supra note 87, at 3171. In 1977, a study conducted by the
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey revealed that 96% of high-income mothers
have access to prenatal care as opposed to only 65% of low-income mothers. See id.
[Vol. 2:323
IMMUNITY OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
continuity." 3 Most indigent patients never see the same physician
twice.
14
In the United States, one out of ten Americans reported that they were
in fair or poor health in 1995.115 In 1988, a study conducted by the Rob-
ert Wood Johnson Foundation revealed that the uninsured reported
higher rates of illness, but fewer physician visits and hospitalizations than
the insured." 6 Additionally, approximately one million individuals re-
port attempting to obtain necessary medical care, but not receiving it for
economic reasons.'
1 7
Fears of medical malpractice and invidious stereotypes of the medi-
cally indigent preclude the development of relationships between
physicians and poor patients." 8 The philosophy of benevolence and
altruism associated with a physician's oath1 19 is often not realized be-
cause indigent care ultimately depends on an individual physician's
choice. 2°
In order to encourage physicians to choose to provide free indigent
care, the AMA, much like the American Bar Association, recommends a
113. See Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 4. at 864 (stating the uninsured generally do
not have a consistent source of care); see also Improving Health Care for the Poor, supra
note 63, at 465.
114. See Improving Health Care for the Poor, supra note 63, at 465.
115. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Fastats (last modified Sep. 9,
1999) <http'J/www.cdc.gove/nchs/fastatsLhstatus.htm>.
116. See Robert J. Blendon, What Should Be Done About the Uninsured Poor?, 260
JAMA 3176, 3176 (1988).
117. See id.; Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 4, at 864 (stating that uninsured individuals
are often turned away or discouraged by some health care providers).
118. See Glasson & Orentlicher, supra note 48, at 1741 (suggesting that doctors, like
others in society, may be too willing to accept stereotypes about the poor). In a survey of
family medicine physicians, researchers discovered the physicians held false and unfavora-
ble beliefs about the indigent. See id. In particular, the physicians believed indigent wo-
men have children as a means of collecting welfare benefits and that the poor abusively
overused the health care system. See id.
119. See John A. Siliciano. Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice Stan-
dard, 77 VA. L. Rav. 439, 450 (1991) (noting a physician's long-standing ethical commit-
ment to serving those in need); see also The Oath of Hippocrates (visited Nov. 13, 1999)
<http://www.humanities.ccny.cuny.edulhistory/reader/hippoath.htm>. An excerpt from the
Hippocratic oath states: "Into whatever houses I enter. I will go into them for the benefit
of the sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption . . . ." Id.;
see also The World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva (1948) Physician's Oath
(last modified Dec. 16, 1998) <http://www.cirp.orgllibrary/ethicsigeneval> (referring to the
physician's oath adopted by the World Medical Association immediately prior to the
United Nations' adoption of the Universal Declaration).
120. See Friedman, supra note 103, at 1481 (referring to the vulnerability of the indi-
gent in relying on the whims of providers).
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physician offer fifty hours per year of charity care. 121 Although a sub-
stantial number of physicians offer charity care, a disproportionate share
of charity care is provided by physicians who already serve high levels of
Medicaid patients. Thus, the responsibility to serve the poor is unequally
distributed. 2 2 The AMA estimates that one-quarter to one-third of phy-
sicians fail to provide medical care to the poor.123 Unfortunately, until
health care is acknowledged as an essential human right, the status of
indigent care will remain contingent upon personal choices by individual
physicians.1
24
B. Vulnerability of Charitable Programs
There is inherent inequality in a society that requires its less fortunate
to rely on the charity of others. Programs that only serve the poor have a
tendency to be poor programs. 1' For example, Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children, a program exclusively serving the poor, is subject to
drastic cutbacks due to its political vulnerability.'26 Furthermore, welfare
programs are often characterized by severe denials of privacy and dig-
nity.'27 Social Security, on the other hand, has remained politically strong
because it serves individuals of all economic classes. 128 Social Security
benefits increase with increases in living costs and the program avoids any
intrusion into the privacy of its beneficiaries. 129
The vulnerability of welfare programs is exacerbated by the fact that
the poor have almost no participation in the process of creating legisla-
tion that will govern their lives.' 3° The poor lack the finances to contrib-
ute to the political campaigns of elected officials and vote in
disproportionately low numbers.' 3 1 There are few organizations that
121. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2536; see also Lundberg &
Bodine, supra note 47, at 3045 (encouraging fellow physicians to give a minimum of 50
hours per year, or one week, of charity care).
122. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 3535 (reporting that physi-
cians responded to the increase in uninsured Americans by providing a greater amount of
charity care, but the charity care was not equally distributed among physicians).
123. See id.
124. See Friedman, supra note 103, at 1481 (stating that health care inevitably be-
comes charity that is doled out sporadically, subject to when providers are moved to do so,
and every provider is not so moved).
125. See Law, supra note 65, at 773 (explaining the inefficacy of charitable programs).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Laurence E. Norton, II, Not Too Much Justice for the Poor, 101 DICK. L.
REv. 601, 601 (1997) (describing how laws affecting the poor are unfairly enacted).
131. See id.
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lobby on behalf of the interests of the poor, and lawyers available to the
poor, through legal services organizations, are precluded from advocating
for the poor in the legislative process.132 The poor are thus relegated to
rely on a legal system that has typically been indifferent to the plight of
the poor.' 33
C. Consequences for the Whole Community
The consequences of the lack of access for the medically indigent reach
beyond the poor.' Because the medically indigent do not have a contin-
uous relationship with a general physician, the indigent seek primary care
in hospital emergency rooms, inappropriate and costly sites for routine
care. 1 35 Providing primary care in an emergency room is "equivalent to
tending a rose garden with a bulldozer." '36 By the time indigent patients
reach the emergency room, they often present severe health problems
and as a result, suffer worse outcomes.1 37 Because indigent patients
rarely see the same physician twice, medical procedures are often dupli-
cated and the quality of care is inferior.1 38 Consequently, health care
costs rise, resources are misappropriated, and indigent patients' medical
outcomes suffer.
139
Society's failure to adequately provide health care for individuals may
result in a threat to public health." Moreover, failure to adequately pro-
tect the community against individuals with contagious diseases breaches
a society's duty of collective protection to all members."' The health
132. See id.
133. See id. at 604.
134. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2534 (discussing the ramifi-
cations of the lack of health care for the poor).
135. See id; Ethical Issues in Health Care System Reform, supra note 45, at 1056; see
also Stacy, supra note 106, at 78.
136. American Medical Association, supra note 43. at 2534.
137. See id. (suggesting that indigent patients without primary care visit the emer-
gency room as a last resort); see also Stacy, supra note 106, at 78 (noting that a dispropor-
tionate number of the uninsured visit hospitals with conditions that could have been
prevented if treated earlier).
138. See Improving Health Care for the Poor, supra note 63, at 465 (listing the
hallmarks of primary care based in hospitals, such as long waiting times and a lack of
continuity).
139. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2534.
140. See generally Ethical Issues in Health Care Systemn Reform, supra note 45, at 1057
(commenting that "the health of the community is no better than the health of its mem-
bers"). For example, individuals with highly contagious diseases present an enormous
threat to the rest of the community. See id.; see also Friedman, supra note 103, at 1481-82
(describing the effects of not treating the poor on the whole American community).
141. See Ethical Issues in Health Care System Reform, supra note 45, at 1057 (describ-
ing social contract theory as a basis for the duty of collective protection).
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status of the poor, therefore, has broad implications for the health of the
entire community.
V. THE PROPOSAL OF IMMUNITY FOR VOLUNTEER HEALTH
CARE PROVIDERS
A. Texas
Texas once held the title of the "lawsuit capital of America" due to the
generosity of jury awards.'42 During the last decade, Texas has under-
gone a drastic transformation of its legal system through a movement of
tort reform.' 43 The now Republican Texas Supreme Court rules against
plaintiffs seventy-five percent of the time, compared with only thirty per-
cent in the mid-1980's. 1" The political action committee of Texans for
Lawsuit Reform is currently one of the largest in the state, donating over
one million dollars to state political candidates.
14 1
In the recent wave of tort reform and in response to the health care
needs of the indigent community, the Texas legislature has recently
passed legislation that provides the following:
A volunteer health care provider who is serving as a direct service
volunteer of a charitable organization is immune from civil liability
for any act or omission resulting in death, damage, or injury to a
patient if: (1) the volunteer was acting in good faith and in the course
and scope of the volunteer's duties or functions within the organiza-
tion; (2) the volunteer commits the act or omission in the course of
providing health care services to the patient; (3) the services pro-
vided are within the scope of the license of the volunteer; and (4)
before the volunteer provides health care services, the patient, or if
the patient is a minor or is otherwise legally incompetent, the pa-
tient's parent, managing conservator, legal guardian, or other person
with legal responsibility for the care of the patient signs a written
statement that acknowledges: (A) that the volunteer is providing
care that is not administered for or in expectation of compensation;
and (B) the limitations on the recovery of damages from the volun-
teer in exchange for receiving the health care services146
142. William Glaberson, Texas, Once U.S. 'Lawsuit Capital,' Now Leads Judicial 'Re-
form' Effort Courts Overturn Damage Awards Seen As Excessive, THE PALM BEACH POST,
June 14, 1999, at 12A.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.004(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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The volunteer immunity granted in the legislation is quite expansive,
encompassing physicians, physician assistants, registered and licensed vo-
cational nurses, pharmacists, podiatrists, dentists, dental hygienists, and
optometrists in its definition of "volunteer health care provider." ' 7
However, volunteer immunity is inapplicable to any acts or omissions
that are "intentional, willfully or wantonly negligent, or done with con-
scious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others."' 48
The legislation, effective September 1, 1999, is an expansion of Good
Samaritan legislation that provides for the rewarding of good deeds with
limited liability.' 49 Currently, each state in the United States, as well as
Washington, D.C., has enacted some form of Good Samaritan law. 5°
Despite the lack of data supporting the effectiveness of Good Samaritan
legislation,' 5 ' many states are expanding the doctrine to include volun-
teer and charitable immunity legislation.' 52 Texas legislators apparently
expect that volunteer immunity will overcome the obstacles of potential
medical malpractice claims and encourage health care professionals
to engage in benevolent volunteerism. An increasing number of states
have adopted similar legislation'53 despite the lack of empirical data to
147. Id. at § 84.003(5)A-J (Vernon Supp. 2000).
148. Id. at § 84.007(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
149. See id. at § 74.001 (Vernon 1999). Good Samaritan legislation in Texas provides
immunity to any person who administers emergency care, in good faith, at the scene of an
emergency. See id. Good Samaritan immunity extends to civil damages for any act per-
formed during the emergency so long as the act was not willful or wantonly negligent. See
id.
150. See Bridget A. Burke. Using Good Samaritan Acts to Provide Access to Health
Care for the Poor: A Modest Proposal, I ANNALs H-xAtm L 139, 140 (1992).
151. See Giesen, supra note 3. at 288-89. There has been no case of malpractice in the
United States where a physician was sued for medical aid rendered at the site of an emer-
gency. See id.
152. See Burke, supra note 150. at 141. In fact, some studies have revealed that physi-
cians volunteerism has been completely unaffected by Good Samaritan legislation. See id.;
see also American Medical Association. supra note 43. at 2533.
153. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-571 (West 2000); D.C. COMt ANN. § 2-1345
(1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.1345 (\Vest 1999). GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.1 (1999); HAW.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 662D-2 (Michie Supp. 1999); 745 II. COMP. STAT. ANN. 49/30 (Vest
1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-02.2 (1999), S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-56-180 (\Vest Supp.
1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.3 (Michie 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-106 (Michie
1998); Fred Wurlitzer & Robert McCool, Editorial. Liability Inmnunitv for Physician Vol-
unteers, 272 JAMA 31, 31 (1994). See generally Legal Jnumnunitv for Uncompensated Medi-
cal Care Providers (visited Jan. 25, 2000) <http'Jlw-w.ama-assn.orgamalpubifeaturel
0,1127,304/23,FF.html>.
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support the causal connection between statutory immunity and volun-
teerism. 154
B. Other States
The District of Columbia, North Dakota, and Arizona have adopted
similar legislation to protect volunteer health care providers.155 In the
District of Columbia, volunteer immunity legislation was passed in 1991,
in response to the need for gynecological and obstetrical care among indi-
gent women.156 The volunteer immunity legislation amended the Dis-
trict's Good Samaritan Act'57  and met with little opposition.t 58
Proponents of the amendment, including the Coalition Against Lawsuit
Abuse and the American Tort Reform Association, argued it would pro-
mote volunteerism and create access to health care for the indigent.159
The only opponent to the amendment, the District of Columbia Trial
Lawyers Association, voiced its concern that the poor should not be
stripped of their inalienable right to sue simply because they are poor. 160
North Dakota passed similar legislation, amending its Good Samaritan
Act to provide for "immunity for physicians who volunteer with no com-
pensation at a free clinic., 161 The only opposition to the legislation came
from the North Dakota Trial Lawyers Association, whose representative
stated that economically deprived people should not be subject to "any-
thing less than the rest of us in our society expect and demand from our
medical community.' ' 62
Similarly, in Arizona, volunteer immunity legislation163 met with little
opposition, except for the Arizona Trial Lawyers Association.' 64 An at-
torney for the Association voiced the organization's concerns that the
154. See John Brown, Comment, Statutory Immunity for Volunteer Physicians: A Vehi-
cle for Reaffirmation of the Doctor's Beneficent Duties - Absent the Rights Talk, 1-SPG
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 425, 443 (1996).
155. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1345 (1999); N.D. CETrr. CODE. § 32-03.1-02.2 (1999);
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-571 (West 2000); see also Legal Immunity for Volunteer Doc-
tors, WASH. POST, May 31, 1990, at B6.
156. See Brown, supra note 154, at 441.
157. See id.; see also Legal Immunity for Volunteer Doctors, THE WASH. POST, May
31, 1990, at B6.
158. See Brown, supra note 154, at 443.
159. See Burke, supra note 150, at 145.
160. See id.
161. Brown, supra note 154, at 444; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-02.2 (1999).
162. Brown, supra note 154, at 445 (referring to comments made by the Trial Lawyers'
Association that were never debated).
163. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-571 (West 1999).
164. See Brown, supra note 154, at 444-46 (discussing the ease with which such legisla-
tion passed).
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legislation would result in a taking of the rights to sue for personal inju-
ries "in an effort to give protection to a certain segment of society."',-'
Despite the opposition, the legislation is in effect today.
When analyzing the efforts of other states to provide immunity for vol-
unteer health care providers, the most disconcerting aspect of their legis-
lative processes is the ease with which such legislation has been created.
Opposition to the legislation was voiced only by attorneys, a group
trained in protecting the legal rights of individuals." The lack of sub-
stantial opposition suggests that the idea of rewarding volunteerism, re-
gardless of the effects on the indigent, is widely accepted. Furthermore,
as other states follow the trend of adopting volunteer immunity legisla-
tion,1 6 7 the opportunity to delve into the status of indigent health care in
this country slowly diminishes.
VI. AN UNSUITABLE SOLUTION
A. Myth of the Litigious Poor
Volunteer immunity legislation is predicated on the assumption that
health care providers do not volunteer their services simply because of
liability concerns."' This simplified explanation, however, does not rely
on accurate premises.
The poor, contrary to persistent myth, are not a litigious group.' 9 In-
digent patients rarely pursue their right to sue in court. 170 In a case-con-
trol study of fifty-one hospitals in New York State, poor patients were
found to be significantly less likely to file a malpractice claim, even after
165. Id. at 446.
166. See id. at 444-46 (referring to opposition voiced by North Dakota and Arizona
Trial Lawyers' Associations).
167. See generally American Medical Association, Legal Innunity for Uncompensated
Medical Care Providers (visited Jan. 25, 2000) <httpJ/vww.ama-assn.orgiama/pub/featurel
0,1127,304/23,FF.html> (listing the states that passed immunity legislation for uncompen-
sated health care providers between the years of 1993-1997).
168. See Burke, supra note 150, at 142 (explaining that the expansion of Good Samari-
tan legislation is premised on the assumption that liability concerns are responsible for lack
of medical access to the indigent).
169. See American Medical Association. supra note 43, at 2535 (referrng to the con-
clusions of a case-study on lawsuits by the indigent); Brown. supra note 154, at 444-47
(referring to the discussions surrounding the passage of immunity legislation in North Da-
kota and Arizona); Burke, supra note 150, at 147-48; Helen R. Burstin, et al., Do tie Poor
Sue More? A Case-Control Study of Malpractice Claims and Socioeconomic Status, 270
JAMA 1697, 1697 (1993); Glasson & Orentlicher, supra note 48, at 1740. In fact, the likeli-
hood of the poor bringing lawsuits is only "10% to 20% that of wealthier patients.- Id.
170. See Burke, supra note 150, at 147; Burstin, supra note 169, at 1697.
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controlling for the presence and severity of medical injury. 7 ' The indi-
gent maintain a lower likelihood of suing despite the fact that they are
more likely to suffer negative medical outcomes or injury because of gen-
eral ill health and lack of continuity of health care." 2 Furthermore, be-
cause of a generally lower educational status among the indigent, many
indigent patients may not be aware of their right to sue for medical mal-
practice or have access to legal assistance.'73 Legal aid lawyers available
to the poor generally do not or cannot pursue medical malpractice
claims.17 4
Given the inadequacy of health care, indigent patients are not likely to
sue the few physicians who treat them for fear of alienation. 7 5 Lastly,
medical malpractice claims of indigent patients are not lucrative to plain-
tiff attorneys because of the patients' reduced expected future
earnings. 176
B. Cost of Free Care
"The problem of tort liability when treating the indigent is not really a
problem with the tort system so much as it is a problem with the health
care insurance system."'177 If malpractice liability concerns among physi-
cians are unfounded, then volunteer immunity legislation proposes a so-
lution to the wrong problem.
Under volunteer immunity legislation, the indigent population is forced
to relinquish their rights to sue for negligent care in exchange for access
to care, thus maintaining the status quo and "stratify[ing] the 'haves' from
the 'have nots.' ,178 The infringement on the indigent individual's right to
sue for injuries is disguised as a necessary sacrifice for the good of the
171. See Burstin, supra note 169, at 1697 (discussing the results of a study of indigent
patients). Similarly, indigent patients rarely sue for breast cancer malpractice, the second
most common basis for litigation and the most expensive to indemnify. See generally Ken-
neth A. Kern, Editorial, Do the Poor Sue More?, 271 JAMA 503, 504 (1994).
172. See American Medical Association, supra note 43, at 2536 (disputing any relation
between the poor medical outcomes of indigent patients and malpractice suits); see also
Glasson & Orentlicher, supra note 48, at 1740 (negating the myth that the poor are
litigious).
173. See Burke, supra note 150, at 147; Burstin, supra note 169, at 1697.
174. See Burke, supra note 150, at 147-48.
175. See id. at 147 (disputing myths that the poor are litigious).
176. See id. at 148 (discussing an indigent's probable law earning power); see also
Glasson & Orentilcher, supra note 48, at 1740.
177. Glasson & Orentilcher, supra note 48, at 1740.
178. Burke, supra note 150, at 147.
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overall public.' 79 The donation of an individual's right to sue to the pub-
lic is as unjust as a compulsory donation to a charity."t 0 In analogous
situations, such as the doctrine of eminent domain,"' the seizure of an
individual's right to life, health or property requires just compensation.' 2
Furthermore, a duty of due care in emergencies exists on behalf of the
health care provider regardless of whether compensation is involved;
there is no plausible relationship between payment and liability."s When
a patient-physician relationship is established, a physician is required to
exercise the same level of care to the patient, regardless of whether the
patient can compensate the physician."s The duty of due care does not
vary with the financial status of the duty-holder, nor does it require a
contractual relationship exist.' In fact, a duty of due care may exist
between strangers who have no contractual relationship because the duty
of due care is derived from the power of individuals to do or avoid doing
harm."8 Thus, both rich and poor duty-holders should be held accounta-
ble for their negligence."8
"Immunity statutes fail to make good public policy, not only because
they eliminate a patient's right to recover for injuries, but because they
remove an effective deterrent to substandard medical care by
physicians."'"m
With the recent passing of a bill that will allow insured patients to sue
their health maintenance organizations (hereinafter HMO)," 9 the United
States House of Representatives recognizes what volunteer immunity leg-
islation has ignored: the deterrent effect of litigation. Removing a pa-
179. See Note, The Quality of Mercy: 'Charitable Torts' and Their Continuing Immu-
nity, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1382, 1389 (1987) [hereinafter The Quality of Mercy] (criticizing
the premise of immunity legislation).
180. See id.
181. See BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990). Eminent domain is defined as
the power of the government to take private property for public use. See td. The power of
eminent domain is found in both the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and state con-
stitutions. See id. The taking of property under the Fifth Amendment requires just com-
pensation. See id.
182. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 179, at 1389.
183. See id. at 1393 (discussing the fact that a contractual obligation does not normally
exist between the provider of charitable health care and the recipient of that care, that
would create a plausible relationship between payment and liability).
184. See Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 4, at 876.
185. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 179, at 1393. See generally Bovbjerg &
Kopit, supra note 4, at 1393.
186. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 179, at 1393.
187. See id.
188. Glasson & Orentlicher, supra note 48, at 1740.
189. See Jon Frandsen, House OKs Right to Sue HMO Plans, SAN Ax-Tomlo ExPRFsS-
NEWS, Oct. 8, 1999, at 1A.
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tient's right to sue for malpractice may potentially eliminate any
monitoring of health care standards. Such harsh ramifications are not
worth legislation that has never been shown to be particularly useful. t9
C. Myth of Malpractice Liability
The danger in adopting volunteer immunity legislation is an ignorance
of a more realistic explanation: health care providers' decisions not to
treat the indigent are heavily influenced by the lack of reimbursement.' 9 '
This is especially evident when considering that Medicaid beneficiaries,
indigent patients with state and federally funded medical coverage,19 2 still
cannot find physicians willing to care for them.193 For physicians treating
Medicaid patients or the medically indigent, the either low or nonexistent
reimbursement does not cover the costs of providing medical care, much
less the costs of malpractice liability.194 Therefore, even if a small per-
centage of the indigent pursue malpractice claims, the fact that any sue at
all is a disincentive for physicians to provide charity care. 95 If the goal of
volunteer immunity legislation is to provide health care for the medically
indigent, a universal health care plan will have a much greater influence
than tort reform.1 96
By addressing the reality that medical professionals may not volunteer
their services to the indigent because it does not pay, solutions aimed at
the training of medical professionals can be explored. Until alternative
explanations are considered, the complexity involved in indigent access to
190. See Burke, supra note 150, at 142; see also The Quality of Mercy, supra note 179,
at 1394 (commenting that there is a lack of evidence supporting the idea that liability de-
ters volunteerism).
191. See Brown, supra note 154, at 439 (suggesting that with volunteer work, unlike
emergency care, a physician weighs the financial consequences of providing free care).
192. See Derham-Aoyama, supra note 50, at 369; DiFlorio, supra note 9, at 148-49.
Medicaid is a state health insurance program, subsidized in part by the federal government,
and available to low-income men, women, children, and individuals with specific disabili-
ties. Each state defines its own scales of eligibility and the federal government funds a
portion of the state's expenses depending on the state's own resources. Consequently,
Medicaid coverage varies from state to state. See id.
193. See Law, supra note 65, at 773-74 (discussing the barriers indigent patients face in
attempting to obtain health care); McGinley, supra note, at 12. A quarter of physicians
nationwide refuse treating Medicaid patients. See Sidney Dean Watson, In Search of the
Story: Physicians and Charity Care, 15 ST. Louis PUB. L. REv. 353, 359 (1996) [hereinafter
Physicans and Charity Care]. Additionally, two thirds of physicians who treat Medicaid
patients, limit the number of patients they treat. See id.
194. See Glasson & Orentlicher, supra note 48, at 1740 (explaining the financial risks
physicians undertake when treating the indigent).
195. See id.
196. See id. (suggesting that the health care system be reformed rather than passing
temporary remedies like immunity legislation).
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health care will be severely undermined by the simplicity of volunteer
immunity legislation.'97
D. Creation of a Dual Standard of Care
Inherent risks exist in a system where indigent patients rely on the be-
nevolence of health care professionals for their health care needs.198
Under such a system, indigent patients are subject to a dual standard of
care because health care services are not readily available and are typi-
cally of lesser quality.' 99 The expansion of charity care and charitable
immunity are not, therefore, adequate solutions to the problem of
access. 20
In Texas, volunteer immunity legislation threatens to redefine the stan-
dard of indigent care."01 Implicit in Texas volunteer immunity legislation
is the idea that "beggars can't be choosers." Because health care is not a
fundamental right, the indigent seem to be forced to accept the services
available to them, regardless of the quality, because they are free. Thus,
volunteer immunity legislation maintains the status quo, and further
removes the nation from the possible recognition of an equal, fundamen-
tal right to health care.20 2
The creation of a dual standard of care is exacerbated by the denial of a
legal remedy to indigent patients injured by a volunteer health care pro-
vider. The poor are forced to trade "their right to sue in exchange for
health care." 3 Volunteer immunity legislation thus effectuates a differ-
ential impact among patients: those who can afford medical care are
granted the right to sue for personal injuries, while indigent patients are
197. See Burke, supra note 150, at 144 (recommending a careful consideration of all
factors affecting the availability of medical care).
198. See id. at 146.
199. See Stacy, supra note 106. at 78-79 (detailing the discrepancies in the quality of
care received by the insured versus the uninsured).
200. See Burke, supra note 150, at 146; see also Bonnie Booth, Wake-up Call on a
Growing Problem, AM. MED. NEws, July 5, 1999, at 19 (describing the AMA President's
visits to over 20 free clinics in the United States). The AMA President called for an under-
standing that ". . . free clinics cannot be the answer to the issue of the uninsured," and that
although free clinics will always be needed, ... they cannot be relied upon as a solution to
a problem of this magnitude." See id.
201. See generally TEx. Civ. PRic. & REMr. CODE ANN., § 84.004 (Vernon Supp.
2000). This provision of immunity seems to have the potential to result in substandard care
because it serves as a disincentive for physicians to practice cautiously.
202. See Burke, supra note 150, at 14647.
203. See id. at 146.
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denied their right to sue in exchange for free medical care.2" The right
to sue for medical malpractice thus becomes a right by purchase.
VII. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
As the debates over health care reform continue, the likelihood that
this nation will agree on a plan for universal health care seems bleak. In
the meantime, there are more feasible alternatives to volunteer immunity
legislation.
A. Mandatory Volunteerism
1. As a Requirement for Licensing
A proposal to increase the number of volunteer health care profession-
als is to require volunteerism as a condition of licensing.2"5 Since 1846,
the original Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association has de-
clared that "to individuals in indigent circumstances, professional services
should be cheerfully and freely accorded. 2 0 6
In 1992, in order to ensure health care professionals would donate their
services, a proposal was made to the AMA that would have required phy-
sicians donate ten percent of their income or fifty hours per year to health
care for the indigent.20 7 The proposal was rejected due to the prevailing
belief that charitable work should be done because of genuine concern
and kindness for the patient, and not forced.20 8
The idea of mandatory volunteerism is particularly appealing when
considering the debt a graduating physician owes to society.209 A physi-
cian's training is financed by state investments derived from taxing state
citizens; a physician's clinical experience is gained by practice on willing
patients. 210 Furthermore, physicians are subject to the licensing powers
204. See Brown, supra note 154, at 446 (stating that volunteer immunity bills "take[s]
those rights in an effort to give protection to a certain segment of society"); Burke, supra
note 150, at 146.
205. See Lewis D. Solomon & Tricia Asaro, Community-Based Health Care: A Legal
and Policy Analysis, 24 FoRDHAM Ul.na. L. J. 235, 276 (1997); see also Improving Health
Care for the Poor, supra note 63, at 276 (advancing the idea that the promise of universal
access may stem from the requirement of mandatory service for all medical school gradu-
ates following completion of residency training).
206. See Solomon & Asaro, supra note 205, at 276.
207. See id. at 277.
208. See id. at 277-78.
209. See Giesen, supra note 3, at 285.
210. See id. See generally Ethical Issues in Health Care System Reform, supra note 45,
at 1057. Society invests large amounts of money in the training of physicians, the construc-
tion of medical faculties, and in medical research. See id.
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of different state authorities."1 Thus, a mutually beneficial relationship
exists between society and physicians and physicians should repay society
for what society has invested in them.
Nevertheless, a proposal for mandatory volunteerism as a condition of
licensing would ensure a steady flow of free health services for the poor
around the country. Perhaps a proposal with less stringent requirements,
such as five percent of income or twenty-five hours per year, might gain
approval among physicians. The effect of such a proposal would be inval-
uable and ensure a steadfast supply of health care.
2. As a Requirement for Medical School Graduation
Mandatory volunteerism as a requirement for medical school gradua-
tion would not only ensure a steady flow of free services, but would also
teach future physicians the importance of serving indigent communities
before they are personally exposed to the financial gain of the practice of
medicine.
By requiring volunteerism before graduation, this proposal addresses
the pitfalls of mandatory volunteerism as a condition of licensing. First,
physicians generally do not practice in areas of greatest need.1 2 Medical
students, on the other hand, can be placed in these areas and their volun-
teer work can be incorporated as part of their clinical training prior to
graduation. Secondly, there is a high saturation of specialists compared
to general physicians.213 Because of the need for primary health care
among the indigent, and the fact that only two percent of medical stu-
dents choose to pursue an area of general medicine upon graduation, 214 it
would be advantageous to utilize medical students prior to their
specialization.
This proposal is particularly effective because of the possible short and
long-term benefits. The immediate benefits are the availability of pools
of medical professional students providing free health care services, and
the emphasis of volunteerism in medical education. The long-term bene-
fit is the potential impact volunteerism may have on these physicians-to-
be to donate their time once in private practice.
B. Government-Paid Insurance Premiums
A more feasible solution may lie in government-paid malpractice insur-
ance premiums. 21 5 Although taxpayer dollars may be required to pay the
211. See Giesen, supra note 3, at 285.
212. See Solomon & Asaro, supra note 205. at 278.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 281.
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premiums, the savings incurred in providing primary and preventive care
for the cost of malpractice insurance are invaluable.216 Furthermore, by
providing preventive and primary care to the indigent population, the
poor would no longer be forced to obtain their primary care in hospital
emergency rooms, thus lowering the overall costs of health care.
In 1995, Kentucky attempted a version of this proposal by enacting a
law that required the state's physicians and attorneys to pay one dollar
per year to help purchase malpractice insurance for the state's free health
care clinics.2 17 The legislation was declared unconstitutional by the At-
torney General because the statute was ambiguous, arbitrary, and consid-
ered "special legislation" because it singled out attorneys and
physicians.2 1 ' Nevertheless, even opponents of the legislation did not at-
tack the premise of the legislation, and only argued that all taxpayers
should contribute financially.2 19 This particular proposal was passed in-
stead of the volunteer immunity lobbied for by a local hospital.220
Although not successful in Kentucky, government paid insurance premi-
ums collected from taxpayers could be an efficient, feasible means of gen-
erating income immediately.
This proposal would also be particularly effective in tapping into a spe-
cific pool of volunteers: retired physicians. Because retired physicians are
generally financially secure, they can devote their time to volunteer. Un-
fortunately, although many retired physicians would like to volunteer,
many have liability concerns since their malpractice insurance terminates
upon their retirement.22 ' By arranging for the government to pay their
insurance premiums, a pool of experienced physicians could be utilized to
serve the poor.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The wave of tort reform sweeping Texas has created an aversion to
liability and has clashed with the movement for health care reform. Vol-
unteer immunity legislation is a product of the desire to reduce the liabil-
ity of volunteer health care providers in hopes of solving the problem of
indigent access to health care. This proposed solution, however, grossly
oversimplifies the problem of indigent health care.
216. See id. 281-82.
217. See Gil Lawson, Dollar-for-Clinics Law Is Ruled Illegal, THE COURIER-J., May
27, 1995, at 1A.
218. See id.
219. See id. Physicians did not challenge the legislation and over $10,000 had already
been collected at the time of the Attorney General's decision. See id.
220. See id.
221. See Solomon & Asaro, supra note 205, at 282 (recognizing the vast amount of
retired physicians willing to volunteer their services and reasons they do not).
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Volunteer immunity legislation is particularly dangerous because it cre-
ates a faqade that the indigent are litigious and are the cause of their own
lack of health care. Such legislation allows for the emergence of a dual
standard of health care among those who can afford remuneration and
those who cannot. This dual standard of care chastises the indigent for
their economic status and forces them to depend on the whims of charity.
There are intrinsic inequalities in a society that allows the dependence
of the indigent on charity. Until there is substantial evidence that this
form of Good Samaritan legislation improves access to health care, Texas
should avoid relying on this legislation to cure the problem of indigent
access. The elitist implication manifested in this legislation - that the indi-
gent must forfeit their legal rights in exchange for "free" care - exacer-
bates the hardships of poverty. Poverty should not require such
degradation.
The right to wellness should not be a right contingent upon economic
status. In this nation premised on self-reliance, the indigent are strug-
gling to survive in a scheme of Social Darwinism disguised as a health
care system. In this nation premised on individual freedoms, the indigent
that succeed in obtaining health care are stripped of their inalienable
rights to sue. The misfortunes of poverty should not justify such robbery.
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